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Abstract: The research investigates the adoption of accounting conservatism and its managerial determinants in Saudi Arabia
during COVID-19 era. firstly, we analyzed the academic literature and developed the framework of accounting conservatism
in terms of definition, advantages, motivations and scientific theories. Secondly to conduct our empirical study where we
choose a sample consisted of 100 firm years' observations which represented the financial statements of the top 50 firms
listed in the stock market in terms of size during two years. Going further, the accounting conservatism mean was 0.4315
during COVID-19 era. the research's results illustrated empirically a positive relation between accounting conservatism,
managerial ownership, institutional ownership, board of directors' size and profitability among the sample. and a negative
relation between accounting conservatism, board of directors' independence, board of directors' duality, firm size and
leverage.
Keywords: Conservatism, Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership, CEO Duality.

1 Introduction
Earnings and related ratios are the most important
information that can affect the decision-making by
stakeholders. According to the importance of earnings'
information in the financial reports, it makes managers under
pressure to prepare financial statements that are acceptable
from both internal and external parties' perspectives, and
resulting in the appearance of information asymmetry issue
between managers and stakeholders [1]. Where this problem
is known in the literature as agency conflict [2]. Going
further, accounting conservatism is a major practice to
control earnings through the alternatives given by
accounting standards. On the other hand, several studies
[3,4,5,6] indicated that the phenomenon of the increasing
accounting conservatism' degree in the financial reports after
the global financial crisis is one of the most important
controversial issues in contemporary accounting thought,
which formed a focus of the academic accounting research
interest. This is despite the severe criticism it is subjected to
as a result of its conflict with some qualitative characteristics
of the accounting information quality (i.e. Neutrality,
Faithful Presentation and Relevance). Especially after the
*Corresponding

emergence of the fair value concept [5] and the tendency of
professional authorities to adopt the concept of fair value in
preparing the new accounting standards. Moreover, with the
beginning of the current century, the academic and
professional interest in accounting conservatism increased
after the failure of many big international companies, such
as Enron in 2001, and TESCO in 2016. One of the reasons
for the failure of these companies was the opportunistic
behavior of these companies' managers and their lack of
commitment to the accounting conservatism adoption.
Which raised doubts about the quality of the disclosed
accounting profits and the extent of the credibility of the
financial report in the honest expression of business results
and financial position. Thus, made accounting conservatism
after these collapses of major international corporations an
essential topic in accounting thought. In addition, since
conservatism considers a measure of biased financial
reporting which may not reflect high-quality earnings, the
relationship between the board of directors, ownership
patterns, organizational characteristics and accounting
conservatism is cloudy [7].
From the above, the importance of this research is driven by
the inconsistencies in the academic literature results and
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previous research gaps related to accounting conservatism.
So, this research aims to identify the major managerial
determinants of adopting accounting conservatism in Saudi
firms during the COVID-19 period. It contributes to the
accounting literature in the context of the Saudi business
environment. especially that of Saudi non-financial firms
listed in the Saudi shares market, where to the authors'
knowledge, accounting conservatism doesn't examine during
this period. Thus, the article continuous as follows: part two
Academic literature reviews and hypotheses development,
part three develops the research model, part four Results, and
part five Conclusions.

2 Academic Literature Review and Hypotheses
Development
2.1 Conservatism in the management and
Accounting Thought
Accounting conservatism has been interpreted as capturing
firms' tendency to adopt a higher verification degree for the
recognition of good news than bad news in the financial
reporting [8] and proved that earnings respond more quickly
and completely too bad than good events or news, meaning
"expect no profits but expect all losses". Then [9] have
shown Accounting conservatism as the choice of available
accounting methods and policies by accounting standards to
report on the lower values of revenues and assets. Moreover,
the higher values of expenses and liabilities, which results in
a lower net book value of equity than the market value. On
another side. It's a firm decision in response to bad news, due
to the unwillingness of managers to take risks in cases of
uncertainty [10]. So we can put forward the accounting
conservatism's nature that no profits are expected (delaying
profits' recognition) and the expectation of all possible losses
(accelerating losses' recognition). In addition, we can argue
that the essence of accounting conservatism's application is
the difference between the market value of equity and
disclosed book value.
Furthermore, the concept of Accounting conservatism in the
academic literature is a bookkeeping guideline that needs a
high degree of verification before a firm can disclose profit
in the financial reports [7]. The major point is to expect the
worst scenario in the future of the firm’s financial
performance [10]. Where, Uncertain liabilities are to be
recognized as they appear. In contrast, revenues can only be
recognized when they are achieved and fully realized. Thus,
it is a way of accounting practice that provides guidance
uncertainty cases [11]. Where the firm has the potential for
bias, and it considers a rule when choosing between two
financial
reporting
alternatives.
So,
Accounting
conservatism can be considered as a control tool to firm's
managers that prefer the results' recognition in the least
opportunistic period. According to [12] accounting
conservatism can help in solving many problems such as
agency cost and information asymmetry [4]. On another side,
accounting conservatism can be aggravated when firms
present certain complex characteristics that limit the
© 2022 NSP
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information's transparency [13].
Going further, accounting conservatism has two types in the
academic accounting literature [9,10]. The first type is
conditional conservatism and It means that the conservatism
is dependent on the occurrence of events, as the book values
of assets are reduced in the unfavorable events, and ignoring
the recognition of the increase in book values under good
events unless there is evidence of its realization in the sense
of the asymmetric timeliness of both good and bad news in
accounting profit. The second type is unconditional
conservatism and it means that the conservatism must be
independent of the occurrence of events. In the sense that
assets are recorded and measured from the beginning with
book values less than their market values over their useful
life in a way that leads to the emergence of unrecorded
goodwill. On another side, the academic accounting
literature addressed the importance of adopting accounting
conservatism policies in financial reporting through four
main interpretations [14]. First, Contracting Explanation as
the application of conservative policies will lead to the
reduction of agency-related problems resulting from the
separation of ownership from management such as
information. Second, Litigation Explanation as the
application of conservative accounting policies will lead to a
reduction in the costs of litigation and compensation. Third,
Tax Explanation, as the application of conservative
accounting policies will lead to a reduction in the value of
taxes payable for the financial period for which the financial
report is submitted and minimize the tax burden. Fourth,
Political Explanation as the application of conservative
accounting policies will lead to a reduction in the political
costs arising from a firm's disclosure of a high-profit value.
But we believe that the contractual interpretation represents
the essence of accounting conservatism's importance, as it is
the main reason for the adherence of the accounting thought
- so far - to the application of accounting conservatism
policies despite the numerous criticisms.
However, Advantages of Accounting Conservatism,
overstating losses and understating profits means that firms
will report lower financial future benefits. Painting a cloudy
image of the firm's financials actually comes with many
benefits. Most likely, it motivates firms to exercise greater
concern in their decisions [15]. Moreover, there are more
possibilities for good surprises, rather than bad surprises,
which are big drivers of stock prices and these rules, should
make it easier for stockholders to judge financial reports in
any financial period [6]. On the other side, Disadvantages of
Accounting Conservatism, the alternatives of accounting
conservatism can arise arguments in interpretation, where,
firms will find methods to manipulate them to their
advantage [13]. Another issue is the possibility of revenue
shifting, if a financial event doesn't meet the reporting
requirements due to conservative policies, it must be
included in the next financial period. This will result in the
overstating of the future period and the understating of the
current period, making it hard for stakeholders to track the
firm events [16].
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So, we can conclude the opinions which supported the
application of accounting conservatism as follows: (a) it
helps to ensure the firm's continuity through the cumulative
effect of conservative accounting policies on profits and
assets. (b) it serves as a mechanism to achieve a balance
between managers and shareholders resulting from the
agency [4]. (c) it reduces information asymmetry between
stakeholders [11]. (d) it reduces the incentives and motives
of management to practice earnings management [1]. (e)
accounting conservatism perform as a protection tool against
managers' opportunism behavior [7]. From another side, we
can put forward conclude the opinions which against the
application of accounting conservatism as follows: (a) it does
not lead to express the reality of financial position or
operational results [9]. and there is an absence of objective
criteria governing its application. (b) it leads to conservative
results in the first period will lead to un-conservative results
in the following periods as a result of duplication in the
revenues' recognition compared to expenses' recognition,
and this has a negative impact on earnings quality. (c) The
negative impact of accounting conservatism on the
characteristics of accounting information, as accounting
conservatism is a type of bias. (d) it helps to form hidden or
secret reserves.

2.2 The Relation between Ownership Structure
and Accounting Conservatism
2.2.1. Managerial Ownership: The concept of Managerial
ownership in the academic accounting literature refers to the
percentage of equity stocks owned by managers' and their
families during the financial period, where, the agency
theory prove that if managers have a high percentage of
ownership, agency conflict will be minimized [11]. In the
related literature, managerial ownership has two different
arguments. managerial ownership can perform as a
monitoring tool in the process of financial reporting that
makes firms tend to be more conservative [17]. on another
side. And [2] assumed that it can also be a factor for
transferring minority stockholders' wealth, and that makes
firms tend to avoid using conservatism policies. Based on
agency theory, managerial ownership will minimize agency
problems because the more stocks are owned by the
managers, the stronger their desire to improve the firm value
and its stocks price. Furthermore, Empirical literature shows
a positive relation between Managerial Ownership and
accounting conservatism [16]. where another part of the
literature shows a negative relation [5,7]. But [18,19] proved
that there is no relation, from above; the following
hypothesis can be developed:
H.1 “Managerial Ownership has a positive relation with
Accounting Conservatism”.
2.2.2. Institutional Ownership: The concept of
Institutional ownership in the academic accounting literature
refers to the percentage of equity stocks owned by
institutions such as investment firms, insurance companies,
mutual or pension funds, endowments or other large
companies that invest funds on behalf of others. Moreover,
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institutional ownerships can influence stock prices through
reputations because institutions are dealing patiently with
their stocks and in case of they start to sell stocks, it can be
considered as a judgment on the stock's value and decrease
its price. From other side, Institutions may also maximize
stock price once they own it. Furthermore, Empirical
literature shows a positive relation between Institutional
Ownership and accounting conservatism [20,21,22]. Where
another part of the literature shows a negative relation [15].
But [2] proved that there is no relation, from above, the
following hypothesis can be developed:
H.2 “Institutional Ownership has a positive relation with
Accounting Conservatism”.

2.3 The Relation between Board of Directors and
Accounting Conservatism
2.3.1. BOD Size: the concept of BOD size in the academic
accounting literature refers to the number of members in the
firm's board, where BOD size may play an important role in
controlling financial reporting through the mentality of each
member. so at least a percentage of BOD will tend to adopt
accounting conservatism. Furthermore, Empirical literature
shows a positive relation between BOD Size and accounting
conservatism [22,23,24]. Where another part of the literature
shows a negative relation [25]. But [26,27] proved that there
is no relation, from above, the following hypothesis can be
developed:
H.3 “BOD Size has a positive relation with Accounting
Conservatism”.
2.3.2. BOD Independence: the concept of BOD
independence in the academic accounting literature refers to
corporate governance that needs a large percentage of board
members to be independent of the firm, that happens when a
board member has not been and is not employed by the firm
and doesn’t have a significant volume of interest in the firm's
performance [2]. The Board of directors' independence was
given legal definition and direction in 2002 in the SarbanesOxley act. Furthermore, Empirical literature shows a
positive relation between Board of Directors Independence
and accounting conservatism [26]. Where another part of the
literature shows a negative relation [22, 23]. But [27] proved
that there is no relation, from above, the following
hypothesis can be developed:
H.4 “BOD Independence has a negative relation with
Accounting Conservatism”.
2.3.3. CEO Duality: The concept of CEO duality in the
academic accounting literature refers to a Board of directors'
characteristic when one-person act as the chairman and Chief
Executive Officer. Where [11] argued that it is a
phenomenon worldwide, which decrease the information
asymmetry, and can make up the conflict between CEO and
stockholders, which is the main source for agency conflicts,
Thus, CEO duality can decrease the agency problem. In
adverse, in firms without CEO duality, executives have more
chances, motivates and intention to manipulate financial
results to achieve their own benefits, resulting in a lower
accounting conservatism [1]. Furthermore, Empirical
© 2022 NSP
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literature shows a positive relation between CEO Duality and
accounting conservatism [3,4]. Where another part of the
literature shows a negative relation [29]. But [9] proved that
there is no relation, from above, the following hypothesis can
be developed:
H.5 “CEO Duality has a negative relation with Accounting
Conservatism”.

2.4 The Impact of Organizational Characteristics
on Accounting Conservatism
2.4.1. Firm Size: Firms tend to minimize the volume of
disclosed earnings in the financial reports to minimize
political costs, where political costs are measured by the firm
size, so, the large-sized firms face greater political costs and
taxation by the government. Thus, large-sized firms try to
adopt accounting policies and alternatives that can decrease
the volume of earnings to decrease the extent of political
costs [26]). Furthermore, Empirical literature shows a
positive relation between firm size and accounting
conservatism [25]. Where another part of the literature
shows a negative relation [27,28]. But [19] proved that there
is no relation. From above, the following hypothesis can be
developed:
H.6 “Firm Size has a negative relation with Accounting
Conservatism”.
2.4.2. Leverage: Debt usage at a certain level will reduce the
cost of capital due to the expected reduction of taxes, and
increase profit, firm value and stock prices as a logical result,
which immediately will benefit managers and investors [18].
Where the higher the leverage ratio, the more likely the firm
will break the financing agreements, so the firm will attempt
to disclose a higher volume of profit that can be achieved by
minimizing expenses. And [26] argued that when the
leverage ratios owned by the firm is large, the firm's ability
to pay off obligations is low. This leads firms to be more
likely to adopt accounting policies that maximize profits or
tend to be not conservative. In other meaning, the higher the
leverage ratio, the conflict between stockholders and
managers will also m which can affect the using conservative
policies. So, the higher leverage leads to higher conservative
financial reporting. Furthermore, Empirical literature shows
a positive relation between Leverage and accounting
conservatism [28]. Where another part of the literature
shows a negative relation [29]. But [30] proved that there is
no relation. From above, the following hypothesis can be
developed:
H.7 “Leverage has a negative relation with Accounting
Conservatism”.
2.4.3. Profitability: the concept of profitability in the
academic accounting literature refers to a set of financial
performance ratios such as return on equity (ROE), earnings
per share (EPS) and return on assets (ROA). Where most
studies depended on ROE to measure profitability,
Furthermore, Empirical literature shows a positive relation
between Profitability and accounting conservatism [29]
Where another part of the literature shows a negative relation
[31,32]. But [7] proved that there is no relation, from above,
© 2022 NSP
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the following hypothesis can be developed:
H.8 “Profitability has a positive relation with Accounting
Conservatism”.

3 Research Model
We indicated the multiplicity of models for measuring
accounting conservatism and the inconsistency of
accounting studies about an optimal model to measure it.
However, we noticed that the model [8] asymmetric
timelines for the recognition of profits and the model Book
to Market Value are the most common models in academic
accounting studies to infer the degree of accounting
conservatism in the financial reporting. So we follow the
proxy of the book to market value (BTM) in our study to
measure accounting conservatism, Thus, this section
presents the regression model that we estimated to analyze
the accounting conservatism's determinants by the following
equation:
AC i,t = α + β1 MO i,t +β2 IO i,t + β3 BODS i,t + β4 BODI
i,t + β5 BODD i,t + β6 FS i,t +β7 LEV i,t +β8 ROE i,t + ε i,t
Where,
Accounting
Conservatism
(AC)
Managerial
Ownership
(MO)
Institutional
Ownership (IO)
BOD Size
(BODS)
BOD
Independence
(BODI)
CEO Duality
(BODD)
Firm Size (FS)
Leverage (LEV)
Profitability
(ROE)

Book to market value (BTM)
Percentage of stocks owned by
managers
Percentage of stocks owned by
institutions
Natural Logarithm of board members
Percentage of nonexecutive members
(1) if CEO and Chairman the same
person, (0) other.
Natural Logarithm of total assets
total liabilities / Total shareholders'
equity
Net profit / Total shareholders' equity

4 Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
We collected our data from the financial reports published
by the Saudi shares market and we depended on 100
observations. On average, accounting conservatism' mean
was 0.4315, median 0.39 and standard deviation 0.1837.
Which shows that corporations in our sample tended to
report a conservative report. from other side, managerial
ownership's mean was 0.095, median 0.085 and standard
deviation 0.072. Institutional Ownership's mean was 0.3573,
median 0.31 and standard deviation 0.1291. BODS 's mean
was 9.5, median 9 and standard deviation 1.6606. BODI 's
mean was 0.494, median 0.5 and standard deviation 0.1445.
BODD 's mean was 0.6, median 1.0 and standard deviation
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0.4924. FS's mean was 1263.3, median 970.50 and standard
deviation 985.42. LEV's mean was 0.4251, median 0.39 and
standard deviation 0.16204. ROE's mean was 0.2274,
median 0.25 and standard deviation 0.0684.
Table 1: Summary of statistics.
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0
furthermore, Table 2 show the correlation coefficients. this
matrix provide that all the explanatory variables are
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correlated with the explained variable (risk of error below
1%), The positive correlation coefficient appears between
accounting conservatism and (managerial ownership 0.147,
institutional ownership 0.037, BODS 0.126, ROE 0.018),
from other side, the negative correlation coefficient appears
between accounting conservatism and (BODI -0.033, BODD
-0.065, FS -0.034, LEV -0.149).
Table 2: Correlation matrix.
Correlations
A
C

M
O

IO

BO
DS

BO
DI

AC

1

M
O

.1
4

.14
7
1

IO

.0
37

.03
7
.16
3
1

.12
6
.14
8
.18
3

.03
.00
8
.04
5

BO
DS

.1
2

.18
3

1

.16
4
1

.04
5

FS
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V

R
O
E

.03
.07
2

.14
.04

.01

.02

.16

.2*

.11
1
.2*

.05

.03

.14
3
.2*
*
.01
2

.00
0

.00 .15
.16
5
6
4
1
.18 .16
BO
.02
.11
.20
.07
8
4
D
1
3*
D
.07
.00
1
.00
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2
.16 .05
5
.07
.11 1
8
7
.2*
.15
.18
-.1
1 .03
LE
.04
.03
6
8
6
V
3
.00
.01 .16 .00 .03 1
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0
.14
.2*
2
4
1
6
E
*
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
BO
DI

.0
3
.0
6
.0
3
.1
4
.0
18

.16
3
.14
8
.00
8
.22
7*

B
O
D
D
.06
.22
*

4.2 Regression Results
Table 3 shows the results by three methods: OLS, fixed
effects and random effects, the variables in the regression
models: accounting conservatism, managerial ownership,
institutional ownership, BODS, BODI, BODD, firm size,
leverage and profitability (ROE). Our table shows that the
coefficient managerial ownership is significantly positive
using two methods (OLS and random effects). This result
confirms the hypothesis H.1 following that managerial
ownership can perform as a monitoring tool in the process of
financial reporting that makes firms tend to be more
conservative. This result is in line with the findings of [16].
moreover, the table shows that the coefficient institutional
© 2022 NSP
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ownership is significantly positive using all methods. This
result confirms the hypothesis H.2. This result is in line with
the findings of [21,22]. Where, the table shows that the
coefficient BODS is significantly positive using all methods.
This result confirms the hypothesis H.3. This result is in line
with the findings of [22, 23,24]. Further, the table shows that
the coefficient BODI is significantly negative using all
methods. This result confirms the hypothesis H.4. This result
is in line with the findings of [22,23]. Moreover, the table
shows that the coefficient BODD is significantly negative
using all methods. This result confirms the hypothesis H.5.
This result is in line with the findings of [29]. Then, the table
shows that the coefficient Firm size is significantly negative
using two methods (OLS and random effects). this result
confirms the hypothesis H.6. This result is in line with the
findings of [27,28]. Moreover, the table shows that the
coefficient leverage is significantly negative using all
methods. this result confirms the hypothesis H.7. This result
is in line with the findings of [29]. Finally, the table shows
that the coefficient profitability (ROE) is significantly
positive using two methods (OLS and random effects). This
result confirms the hypothesis H.8. This result is in line with
the findings of [29].
Table 3: Regression results
VARIABLE
OLS
FIXED
RANDOM
EFFECTS

EFFECTS

MO

0.500718***

-0.499757

0.470097*

IO

0.103432

0.059828*

0.070067*

BODS

0.015987

0.015175

0.014509

BODI

-0.010014

-0.051697

-0.038290

BODD

-0.031379

-0.053097

-0.046634

FS

-0.000009

0.000242

-0.000009

LEV

-0.159732

-0.031108

-0.125737

ROE

0.228502

0.35694**

0.098746

Constant

0.249***

0.1429

0.309**

Observation

100

100

100

R-squared

0.080465

0.849253

0.059391

F-Test

3.98 (0.05)*
Hausman
2.075 (0.99)
Test
***The correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.
**The correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.
* The correlation is significant at the 0.1 level.

5 Conclusions
This article investigated the managerial determinants of
accounting conservatism in Saudi Arabia during COVID-19
era. At the beginning we reviewed the academic literature to
develop the theoretical framework of accounting
conservatism in terms of definition, motivations, advantages,
© 2022 NSP
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disadvantages of the application and academic theories.
Then to conduct our empirical study, we depended on a
sample consisted of top 50 corporations operating in the
Saudi shares market to analyze 100 firm years' observations,
going further, the accounting conservatism mean was 0.4315
during the study. the article's results illustrated empirically a
positive relation between accounting conservatism,
managerial ownership, institutional ownership, board of
directors' size and profitability among the sample. and a
negative relation between accounting conservatism, board of
directors' independence, board of directors' duality, firm size
and leverage. Finally, the article results will add to the
academic literature and help stakeholders to understand the
managerial determinants and motivates of adopting
accounting conservatism based on scientific evidence.
Conflict of interest: The authors declare that there is no
conflict regarding the publication of this paper.
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